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Abstract—We propose and analyze an interleaved variant of
Loidreau’s rank-metric cryptosystem based on rank multipliers.
We analyze and adapt several attacks on the system, propose
design rules, and study weak keys. Finding secure instances
requires near-MRD rank-metric codes which are not investigated
in the literature. Thus, we propose a random code construction
that makes use of the fact that short random codes over large
fields are MRD with high probability. We derive an upper bound
on the decryption failure rate and give example parameters for
potential key size reduction.
Index Terms—Code-Based Cryptography, Rank-Metric Codes,
Gabidulin Codes, Interleaved Codes
I. INTRODUCTION
Code-based cryptosystems have gained large attention in the
last years since they are potentially resistant to quantum com-
puter attacks, in contrast to currently-used number theoretic
systems like RSA or ElGamal. The most famous code-based
cryptosystem is the one by McEliece [1], which is based on
the hardness of decoding in a generic code.
Recently, [2] introduced a system which can potentially
reduce the key size of the original McEliece cryptosystem.
The proposed system uses the same public key as the original
system, but changes the cipher to a corrupted codeword of
an interleaved code. Hence, key attacks are as hard as on the
original McEliece system and one potentially obtains a better
resistance against generic decoding since the interleaved code
can correct significantly more errors than a single Goppa code.
However, Tillich [3] found an attack, which is more efficient
than generic decoding if the error is not chosen carefully. A
repair against Tillich’s attack was proposed in [4].
Rank-metric codes are a promising candidate for code-
based cryptography since generic decoding in the rank metric
appears to be much harder than generic decoding in the
Hamming metric. Hence, they provide significantly smaller
key sizes at the same level of security against generic de-
coding. The rank metric was first considered in a McEliece-
like scheme in [5] (Gabidulin–Paramonov–Tretjakov (GPT)
cryptosystem). There are several modifications of the GPT
system [6]–[14], which are all based on hiding the structure
of a Gabidulin code, the most famous family of rank-metric
codes, from an attacker. However, most of these systems are
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broken by Gibson’s [15] and Overbeck’s [16] attacks, as well
as modifications thereof.
The only Gabidulin-code-based GPT variant that has not
been broken so far is the one by Loidreau [14]. There are also
GPT variants based on other code classes, e.g., [17], [18], as
well as other types of rank-metric-code-based cryptosystems,
e.g., [19]–[21], which we will not consider here.
In this paper, we combine the ideas of the interleaved system
in [2] with Loidreau’s GPT variant [14]. We show that in
principle, Loidreau’s system can be interleaved using classical
decoders for interleaved Gabidulin codes. We also analyze
the security of the new system, including an adaption of
Tillich’s attack to the rank metric. Similar to [4], we describe
how Tillich’s attack can be prevented by choosing the error
matrix in a suitable way. It turns out that the construction
of (in this sense) secure errors requires rank-metric codes
whose minimum distances are close to the Singleton bound.
We show that Gabidulin codes yield potentially insecure error
patterns since the resulting error matrix can be distinguished
from a random one. We further show that depending on the
parameters, one can draw the error matrix in a random way and
fulfill the requirements with high probability. For this choice of
the error, we derive upper bounds on the decryption failure and
present secure parameter sets that demonstrate the potential
key size reduction.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
Let q be a power of a prime and let Fq denote the finite
field of order q and Fqm its extension field of order q
m. We
use Fm×nq to denote the set of all m × n matrices over Fq
and Fnqm = F
1×n
qm for the set of all row vectors of length n
over Fqm . Rows and columns of m× n-matrices are indexed
by 1, . . . ,m and 1, . . . , n, where Ai,j is the element in the
i-th row and j-th column of the matrix A . Denote the set of
integers [a, b] = {i : a ≤ i ≤ b}. By rkq(A) and rkqm(A),
we denote the rank of a matrix A over Fq, respectively Fqm .
For any i, we denote the q-power by [i] := qi.
Let γ =
[
γ1, γ2, . . . , γm
]
be an ordered basis of Fqm over
Fq . By utilizing the vector space isomorphism Fqm ∼= F
m
q ,
we can relate each vector a ∈ Fnqm to a matrix A ∈ F
m×n
q
according to extγ : F
n
qm → F
m×n
q , a =
[
a1, . . . , an
]
7→ A,
where aj =
∑m
i=1Ai,jγi, ∀j ∈ [1, n]. Further, we extend
the definition of extγ to matrices by extending each row and
then vertically concatenating the resulting matrices.
For a field F, the vector space that is spanned by
v1, . . . ,vl ∈ F
n is denoted by 〈v1, . . . ,vl〉F = {
∑l
i=1 aivi :
ai ∈ F}.
The vector space that is spanned by the rows of the
matrix A ∈ Fm×n is denoted by R
(
A
)
, i.e., R
(
A
)
=
〈
[
A1,1, . . . , A1,n
]
, . . . ,
[
Am,1, . . . , A1m,n
]
〉F .
The set of all n×n matrices which have only entries from V
is denoted byMn(V), i.e.,Mn(V) = {A ∈ F
n×n
qm : Ai,j ∈ V}.
The product space of the subspaces A and B is denoted by
A× B.
B. Rank-Metric, Gabidulin and Interleaved Gabidulin Codes
The rank norm rkq(a) is the rank of the matrix representa-
tion A ∈ Fm×nq over Fq . The rank distance between a and b
is dR(a, b) := rkq(a − b) = rkq(A−B). An [n, k, d] linear
code C over Fqm is a k-dimensional subspace of F
n
qm and
minimum rank distance d, i.e, d := mina∈C\{0}{rkq(a)}.
Gabidulin codes [22]–[24] are a class of rank-metric codes.
Definition 1 (Gabidulin Code). A Gabidulin code G(n, k) over
Fqm of length n ≤ m and dimension k is defined by its k×n
generator matrix
G =


g1 g2 . . . gn
g
[1]
1 g
[1]
2 . . . g
[1]
n
...
...
. . .
...
g
[k−1]
1 g
[k−1]
2 . . . g
[k−1]
n

 ,
where g = [g1, g2, . . . , gn] ∈ F
n
qm , rkq(g) = n.
In [23], it is shown that Gabidulin codes are MRD codes,
i.e., d = n − k + 1, and can be decoded uniquely up to t ≤
⌊d−12 ⌋.
Interleaved Gabidulin codes are a code class for which
efficient decoders are known that are able to correct t ≤
⌊ ℓ
ℓ+1 (n− k)⌋ errors
1 with high probability, cf. [25]–[27].
Definition 2 (Interleaved Gabidulin Codes [25]). An inter-
leaved Gabidulin code IG(ℓ;n, k) over Fqm of length n ≤ m,
dimension k ≤ n, and interleaving order ℓ is defined by
IG(ℓ;n, k) :=
{[
c⊤G,1 . . . c
⊤
G,ℓ
]⊤
:cG,i∈G(n, k),∀i∈ [1, ℓ]
}
.
C. Difficult Problems in Rank Metric
In this section, we state difficult variants of the rank
syndrome decoding (RSD) problem which can used for cryp-
tography.
Definition 3 (RSD Distribution). Input: q, n, k, w,m
Choose uniformly at random
• H
$
←− {A ∈ F
(n−k)×n
qm : rkqm(A) = n− k}
• x
$
←− {a ∈ Fnqm : rkq(a) = w}
Output: (H,Hx⊤)
1In this setting, an error of weight t is a ℓ×n matrix over Fqm of Fq-rank
t. Note that this means that the tall (ℓm)× n-matrix obtained by expanding
the matrix component-wise over Fq has rank t.
Definition 4 (Search RSD Problem). Input: (H,y⊤) from the
RSD Distribution
Goal: Find x ∈ {a ∈ Fnqm : rkq(a) = w} such that Hx
⊤ =
y⊤
Note that the Syndrome Decoding Problem in Hamming
Metric can be probabilistically reduced to Search RSD prob-
lem [28].
Definition 5 (Interleaved RSD Distribution). Input:
q, n, k, w,m, ℓ
Choose uniformly at random
• H
$
←− {A ∈ F
(n−k)×n
qm : rkqm(A) = n− k}
• X
$
←− {B ∈ Fℓ×nqm : rkq(B) = w}
Output: (H ,HX⊤)
Definition 6 (Interleaved Search RSD Problem). Input:
(H ,Y ⊤) from the Interleaved RSD Distribution
Goal: Find X ∈ {B ∈ Fnqm : rkq(B) = w} such that
HX⊤ = Y ⊤
Note that the Interleaved Search RSD problem is similar
to the problem proposed in [29, Definition 7]. The only
difference is that the rows of the matrixX in Interleaved RSD
Distribution have the same row space whereas the rows of U⊤
in [29, Definition 7] have the same column space. For a small
interleaving order ℓ, the currently most efficient algorithm
to solve both, the Interleaved Search RSD Problem and the
problem given in [29, Definition 7], was presented in [3]
and will be analyzed in Section IV. For a high interleaving
order ℓ ≥ w, the algorithm proposed in [30] is able to solve
the Interleaved Search RSD Problem with high probability in
polynomial time. For an interleaving order greater than wk,
the algorithm proposed in [31] is able to efficiently solve [29,
Definition 7], see [31, Section 6.5].
III. INTERLEAVING LOIDREAU’S CRYPTOSYSTEM
The system that we propose is a McEliece-type system
based on interleaving the rank-metric codes introduced in [14].
To prove that decryption of the proposed system is success-
ful with high probability, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let P ∈ Mn(V) be an invertible matrix with
entries in a λ-dimensional Fq-linear subspace V of Fqm . Then
∀E ∈ Fℓ×nqm : rkq(EP ) ≤ λ rkq(E).
Proof: The proof is similar to [14]. Let γ′ =
[
γ′1, . . . , γ
′
ℓ
]
be an ordered basis of Fqmℓ over Fqm , e =
[
e1, . . . , en
]
:=
ext−1γ′ (E) ∈ F
n
qmℓ
be of rank weight t, and 〈e1, . . . , en〉Fq =
〈ǫ1, . . . , ǫt〉Fq . Further, let ν1, . . . , νλ be a basis of V .
The entries of the vector eP belong to the vector space
〈ǫ1ν1, ǫ2ν1, . . . , ǫtν1, ǫ1ν2, . . . , ǫtνλ〉Fq of dimension ≤ λt.
The system parameters are shown in Table I. The key gen-
eration, encryption and decryption algorithms are as follows.
Table I
SUMMARY OF THE PARAMETERS
Name Use Restriction
q small field size prime power
m extension degree 1 ≤ m
n code length n ≤ m
k code dimension k < n
λ dimension of the V n
n−k
< λ ≤ ⌊n−k
2
⌋
ℓ interleaving order 1 ≤ ℓ < tpub
tpub error weight in ciphertext tpub = ⌊
ℓ
ℓ+1
n−k
λ
⌋
A. Key Generation
The keys are the same as in [14], i.e.,
• G ∈ Fk×nqm a generator matrix of a random G(n, k),
• S ∈ Fk×kqm , which is random and nonsingular
• P ∈ Mn(V) ⊂ F
n×n
qm , random and non-singular, where
V is a random λ-dimensional Fq-linear subspace of Fqm .
The public key is given by Gpub := SGP
−1.
B. Encryption
1) Choose the error matrix E =
[
e⊤1 , . . . , e
⊤
ℓ
]⊤
randomly s.t.
rkq(E) =
⌊ ℓ
λ(ℓ+ 1)
(n− k)
⌋
=: tpub . (1)
2) Compute the cipher Y = MGpub + E ∈ F
l×n
qm , where
M ∈ Fℓ×kqm is the message matrix.
C. Decryption
1) Compute Y P = MSG + E′, where E′ := EP and
rkq(E
′) ≤ ⌊ ℓ
ℓ+1(n− k)⌋, cf. Lemma 1.
2) Decode Y P in IG(ℓ;n, k) to obtain MS.
3) Compute MSS−1 =M to retrieve the message.
Assuming Gpub cannot be distinguished from a random
matrix2, an attacker needs to generically decode the cipher to
obtain the plain text. This is equal to solving the Interleaved
Search RSD Problem.
IV. ATTACKS ON THE CRYPTOSYSTEM
We recall, analyze, and adapt known attacks on the systems
in [2], [14]. Since the keys are the same as in [14], key attacks
are as hard as on the system in [14].
1) (key attack): In [14], a structural attack is described,
which is based on brute-forcing a number of (λ − 1)-
dimensional subspaces of Fmq . The work factor is given by
3
WFLoi = q
1
2
((λ−1)m−(λ−1)2). (2)
2) (decoding attack): The work factors3 of the algorithms
that correct errors of rank t in an arbitrary [n, k] linear
rank distance code over Fqm are denoted by WFCha(t) [33],
WFOur [34], WFGab(t) [35] and WFAra(t) [36].
Tillich [3] proposed an attack on the interleaved Goppa
codes system in [2], which can be similarly applied here.
The augmented matrix of the public key and the cipher
2The only known distinguisher [32] cannot be applied for a parameter
choice according to Table I.
3 We divide the exponent by 2 to obtain an estimate of the post-quantum
work factor (presuming that Grover’s algorithm can be applied).
GYaug :=
[
G⊤pubY
⊤
]⊤
has the same row space as the ma-
trix GEaug :=
[
G⊤pubE
⊤
]⊤
. Thus, the row space Caug :=
R
(
GYaug
)
contains codewords of weight ≥ dE, where dE
is the minimum rank distance of an error code spanned by
the rows of E, i.e., CE[n, ℓ, dE] := R
(
E
)
. Due to the
restriction on the error matrix E in (1), finding some non-
zero element of the error code can, at least partially, recover
the row space of the extended error matrix extγ(E) since
R
(
extγ(E)
)
= R
(
extγ(e1)
)
+ · · · + R
(
extγ(eℓ)
)
. The
problem of finding low-rank-weight words was studied in [37],
and is in principle equivalent to rank syndrome decoding. In
particular, it has a similar complexity if the weight of the
low-weight words is as large as the error in rank syndrome
decoding, i.e., the smallest-known work factor is
WFE=min{WFCha(dE),WFOur(dE),WFGab(dE),WFAra(dE)}.
Note that since each row of Y is a codeword corrupted by an
error of rank at least dE, the row-wise rank syndrome decoding
has a complexity of at least WFE . Further, this attack has a
higher complexity than generic decoding in Loidreau’s original
system with the same public key if and only if dE >
d−1
2λ .
3) (decoding attack): In [30], a polynomial-time decoding
algorithm is proposed that works for arbitrary interleaved
codes of interleaving degree ℓ ≥ tpub and error matrices of
full rank. However in case of ℓ < tpub, one must brute-force
through the solution space of a linear system of equations,
whose size is exponential in m(tpub − ℓ). By choosing the
parameters according to Table I, this attack is not efficient.
V. CONSTRUCTION OF THE ERROR MATRIX
We have seen in the previous section that in order to resist
Tillich’s attack, the rows of the error matrix E must span
a code of large minimum rank distance, i.e., E must be a
generator matrix of an [n, ℓ, dE >
d−1
2 ] code. The following
statement shows how to construct such a code that still fulfills
the decoding condition (1), which is necessary for successful
decryption.
Theorem 2. Let the error matrix be given by
E = A ·B ∈ Fℓ×nqm ,
where A ∈ F
ℓ×tpub
qm is a generator matrix of a [tpub, ℓ, dE] code
and has full Fq-rank and B ∈ F
tpub×n
q has full rank. Then, E
fulfills (1) and is a generator matrix of an [n, ℓ, dE] code. Also,
E and any row of E has Fq-rank at least dE.
Proof: Since A has tpub columns, its Fq-rank is at most
tpub. Multiplication by the full-rank Fq-matrix B from the
right does not change the Fq-rank, so rkq(E) ≤ tpub and (1)
is satisfied.
To prove that the error matrix spans an [n, ℓ, dE] code, we
first observe that the length of vectors in the row space of E
is n and its Fqm-rank is ℓ (since A has full Fqm -rank and
multiplication by the full-rank matrix B does not change this
rank). Thus it is a code of length n and dimension ℓ over Fqm .
Table II
COMPARISON OF LOIDREAU’S SYSTEM WITH THE PRESENTED INTERLEAVED CODES SYSTEM.
Method q k n m λ ℓ tpub WFLoi WFE WFA Rate Pf Key size
Classic 16 11 27 42 2 1 4 82.00 80.38 ∞ 0.41 −∞ 3.70 KB
Interleaved 16 9 27 42 2 2 6 82.00 86.48 119.00 0.33 −166.00 3.40 KB
Classic 16 14 34 66 2 1 5 130.00 128.39 ∞ 0.41 −∞ 9.24 KB
Interleaved 16 13 31 66 2 2 6 130.00 128.07 215.00 0.42 −266.00 7.72 KB
Classic 16 23 53 62 3 1 5 240.00 198.58 ∞ 0.43 −∞ 21.39 KB
Interleaved 16 22 49 62 3 2 6 240.00 200.34 199.00 0.45 −246.00 18.41 KB
Classic 16 30 60 68 3 1 5 264.00 256.98 ∞ 0.50 −∞ 30.60 KB
Interleaved 16 28 55 77 3 2 6 300.00 257.77 259.00 0.51 −306.00 29.11 KB
As for the minimum distance, we have the following. Let
c1, c2 be two distinct vectors in the row space of E. Then,
we can write them as ci = ai · B, where a1,a2 are in
the row space of A. Since the ci are distinct, so are the
ai. Furthermore, we have dR(a1,a2) ≥ dE. Since B is a
full-rank matrix over Fq, multiplication by it does not change
the rank of a word. Hence, dR(c1, c2) = dR(a1B,a2B) =
dR(a1,a2) ≥ dE, which shows that the rows of E indeed
generate an [n, ℓ, dE] code. As a result, any row of E, as well
as E itself, has Fq-rank dE.
Due to the rank-metric Singleton bound, the minimum dis-
tance of the error code is upper bounded by dE ≤ tpub− ℓ+1.
The work factor of [3] is greater than RSD of Loidreau’s
system if dE >
d−1
2λ . To gain in security level (or to reduce
the key size), we must choose a suitable [tpub, ℓ, dE] code with
d−1
2λ < dE ≤ tpub − ℓ+ 1 . (3)
An obvious choice would be a Gabidulin code attaining the
upper bound. However, we will show in Appendix A that in
this case, the error code R
(
E
)
can be distinguished from a
random code, which might be a weakness.
In the next section, we will show that it suffices to choose
a random code as the error code since its minimum distance
attains the upper bound in (3) with high probability, cf. [38].
As an alternative, one can use structured codes that arise
from codes whose minimum distance is close to the upper
bound. However, such codes have not been studied in the
literature and, hence, this paper provides a motivation to study
these codes. We will formally state the research problem in
the conclusion.
VI. USING RANDOM ERROR CODES
In this section, we show that by choosing A uniformly at
random among all full-rank matrices in F
ℓ×tpub
qm , one obtains
an [n, ℓ, tpub − ℓ + 1] error code with high probability. For
this choice of A, we then analyze the decryption failure
probability.
A. Probability of E Generating an [n, ℓ, tpub − ℓ+ 1] Code
Theorem 3 (Probabilities for MRD codes [38]). Let X ∈
F
k×(n−k)
qm be randomly chosen. Then
Pr
[
R
([
Ik|X
])
is an MRD code
]
≥ 1− kqkn−m,
where Ik denotes the k × k identity matrix.
Note that for practical parameters, it might not be feasible
to determine the minimum rank distance of the chosen code
since the fastest-known algorithms to compute the minimum
rank distance are exponential in the code parameters.
Proposition 4. Let E = AB, where A is drawn uniformly
at random among all full-rank matrices in F
ℓ×tpub
qm and B
uniformly at random among all full-rank matrices in F
tpub×n
q .
Then the probability that E is a generator matrix of a
[n, ℓ, tpub − ℓ+ 1] code is ≥ 1− ℓq
ℓtpub−m.
Proof: It follows directly from Theorems 2 and 3.
Note that if the inverse of the probability thatA is not MRD,
i.e., ℓ−1qm−ℓtpub , is above the security level, this choice of the
error does not decrease the security of the system. We take
this into account for the choice of the proposed parameters
and show the values in Table II.
B. Decryption Failure Probability
The decryption algorithm fails if and only if the decoding
of the interleaved Gabidulin code fails.
Lemma 5. Let B be a fixed subspace and A a subspace
generated by α random and linearly independent elements of
Fqm . Then,
Pr[dim(A× B) = αβ] ≥ 1− αq−(m−αβ).
Proof: See [39, Proposition 3.3].
Theorem 6. Let E˜ = AB˜, whereA is chosen as random full-
rank matrix of F
ℓ×tpub
qm and B as a random matrix of F
tpub×n
q .
Further let dim(〈Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,tpub〉Fq × V) = λtpub for i =
1, . . . , ℓ. Then correcting E˜P in IG(ℓ;n, k) succeeds with
probability
≥
tpubλ∑
t′=ℓ
(1− 4
qm
)
(
1− q
mℓ
qmt
′
)ℓ
qλtpubn
t′−1∏
i=0
(qtpubλ − qi)(qn − qi)
qt′ − qi
.
Proof: The error that has to be decoded during decryption
can be written as E˜P = A′B′, where the i-th row of A′ ∈
F
ℓ×λtpub
qm is a basis of the product space 〈Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,tpub〉Fq×
V and B′ ∈ F
λtpub×n
q . Since dim(〈Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,tpub〉Fq ×V) =
λtpub and B˜ is random, the matrix B
′ can be seen as
random element of F
λtpub×n
q and (EP )i,j as random element
of 〈Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,tpub〉Fq × V , see [39, Proposition 4.3]. Thus,
when applying the interleaved decoder proposed in [25], [40],
the probability of correcting E˜P successfully is
≥
tpubλ∑
t′=ℓ
(1− 4q−m)
(
1− q−m(t
′−ℓ)
)ℓ
Pr[rkFq (E˜P ) = t
′].
Further since rkq(A
′) = λtpub, the probability
Pr[rkFq(E˜P ) = t
′] is equal to the probability that the
random matrix B′ has rank t′ [39, Proposition 4.3], i.e.,
Pr[rkFq (E˜P ) = t
′] =
1
qλtpubn
t′−1∏
i=0
(qtpubλ − qi)(qn − qi)
qt′ − qi
.
Note that the error in Theorem 6 is not necessary full-rank.
However, it seems possible to adapt the proof of the bound
in [25], [40] to random full-rank errors, where we conjecture
that the lower bound on the success probability will be higher
in case of full-rank errors. Based on this conjecture
the decryption algorithm in Section III fails with probability
≤ 1−
tpubλ∑
t′=ℓ
(1− 4
qm
)
(
1− q
mℓ
qmt
′
)
(1− tpub
q
λtpub
qm
)
qλtpubn
t′−1∏
i=0
(qtpubλ − qi)(qn − qi)
qt′ − qi
.
We believe that the latter bound on the decryption failure is
not tight since 1) dim(〈Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,tpub〉Fq×V) = λtpub is not
a necessary condition to successfully decode but only required
for the correctness of Theorem 6 and 2) the bound was derived
for EP that might not have full rank. Nevertheless, for the
parameters proposed in Table II, even the inverse of this loose
upper bound on the decryption failure rate is below the claimed
security levels.
VII. POTENTIAL KEY SIZE REDUCTION
For the error construction proposed in Proposition 4, we
propose parameters for (post-quantum) levels of security of
80, 128, 196 and 256 bit with respect to the known attacks in
Table II. The explicit work factors, the inverse of the probabil-
ity that A is not MRD denoted by WFA := log2 ℓ
−1qm−ℓtpub ,
the rate k/n, the key size qk(n−k) and the upper bound on the
decryption failure Pf in bits are presented for dE = tpub−ℓ+1.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a rank-metric McEliece-type
cryptosystem based on applying the interleaving approach
of Elleuch et al. on Loidreau’s cryptosystem. We analyzed
possible attacks and showed that structural attacks are as hard
as for Loidreau’s system but an additional decoding attack is
facilitated by interleaving. The efficiency of the latter attack
can be reduced by choosing the error matrix as a generator
matrix of a code with large minimum distance. We suggested
design rules of the system and proved that depending on the
parameters, a random construction of the error matrix fulfills
the requirements with high probability. For this choice of the
error, we derived upper bounds on the decryption failure and
presented valid parameter sets that permit to decrease the key
sizes.
Related Open Research Problem
Note that (3) does not restrict the code generated by A to
be MRD but also allows codes whose minimum distances are
close to tpub−ℓ+1. Since only little is known about non-MRD
codes, the cryptosystem proposed here gives motivation to an
interesting new research direction:
Open Research Problem 1. Given an extension field Fqm ,
n ≤ m, k < n, and d = n− k + 1− ε, for some ε ∈ N, ε≪
n− k, find a rank-metric code with parameters [n, k, d] over
Fqm with efficient decoder, which—vaguely stated—cannot be
distinguished from a random rank-metric code as easily as a
Gabidulin code (cf. Appendix) below).
APPENDIX
In this section, we show that choosing A (cf. Theorem 2)
to be a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, results in an
error code (i.e., the code spanned by the rows of E) that is
distinguishable from a random error matrix. Although this does
not directly lead to an explicit attack, which e.g., recovers the
error matrix, this might be a weakness of ciphers obtained
from these A.
We use the fact that the augmented matrix obtained by
vertically concatenating Gpub and the cipher Y , has the
same row space as the same construction with Gpub and the
unknown error E, i.e., R
(
GYaug
)
= R
(
GEaug
)
. Thus, the
augmented matrix might reveal the structure of the error matrix
E by applying the following operator to it, as we will see in
the following.
Definition 7 (q-Sum). Let C[n, k] be a linear code over Fqm
and i ∈ N0. Then, the (i
th) q-sum of C is defined by
Λi(C) = C + C
[1] + · · ·+ C[i].
A. Distinguishing the Augmented Code
We first state the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let E be constructed as in Theorem 2, where A
is a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code. Then,
dim(Λi(Caug)) ≤ min{(i+ 1)k +min{ℓ+ i, tpub}, n}.
Proof: By definition Λi(Caug) = Λi(R
(
Gpub
)
) +
Λi(CE). Since A is a generator matrix of a [tpub, k] Gabidulin
code, dim(Λi(CE)) = min{ℓ+ i, tpub}. Thus,
dim(Λi(Caug)) = min{dim(Λi(R
(
Gpub
)
)) + min{ℓ+ i, tpub}, n}
≤ min{(i+ 1)k +min{ℓ + i, tpub}, n}.
If A in Theorem 2 is chosen to be a random full-rank ma-
trix, we have dimΛi(R
(
E
)
) = min{(i+1)ℓ, tpub} with high
probability. Hence, by the same arguments as in Lemma 7, the
overall augmented code has dimension
dim(Λi(Caug)) =min{dim(Λi(R
(
Gpub
)
))
+ min{(i+ 1)ℓ, tpub}, n}
≤min{(i+ 1)k +min{(i+ 1)ℓ, tpub}, n}.
By Lemma 7, for 2k + min{ℓ + 1, tpub} < n (which simply
means that for i > 0, min{(i+1)k+min{ℓ+i, tpub}, n} < n),
the dimension of Λi(Caug) with a Gabidulin code matrix A is
smaller than the respective dimension when using a random
A, with high probability. Hence, it can be distinguished.
B. Distinguishing the Dual Augmented Code
We study the dual of the augmented matrix.
Lemma 8. Let
C⊥aug := R
([
Gpub
Y
])⊥
= R
([
Gpub
E
])⊥
,
then C⊥aug = R
(
Gpub
)⊥
∩R
(
E
)⊥
= R
(
Hpub
)
∩R
(
HE
)
.
Proof: For the code C⊥aug it holds that
C⊥aug =
{
c′ : c′
[
G⊤pubE
⊤
]
= 0k+ℓ
}
= {c′ : c′G⊤pub = 0k} ∩ {c
′ : c′E⊤ = 0ℓ}
= R
(
Gpub
)⊥
∩R
(
E
)⊥
,
where 0i denotes the all-zero vector of length i.
Lemma 9. There is an HE of the form
HE =
[
A⊥Binv
Bker
]
∈ Fn−ℓ×nqm ,
where Binv ∈ F
tpub×n
q has Fqm -rank tpub, Bker ∈ F
(n−tpub)×n
q
has Fqm -rank n−tpub,A
⊥ ∈ F
(tpub−ℓ)×tpub
qm and (A
⊥B⊤invB
⊤)
is a parity-check matrix to A.
Proof: Since B ∈ F
tpub×n
q is of full rank and defined
over Fq , we can find a basis Bker ∈ F
(n−tpub)×n
q of its right
kernel. Note that Bker has full Fq- and Fqm -rank. By the basis
extension theorem, we can extend the linearly independent
rows of Bker into a full basis of F
n
q . These further tpub basis
element form the rows of Binv. Note that also Binv has full
Fq- and Fqm-rank and any non-zero vector in the row space
of Binv is linearly independent to the rows of Bker. Hence,
also the rows of A⊥Binv are linearly independent of the rows
of Bker, which, together with the fact that A
⊥ has full rank,
shows that HE has full Fqm-rank n− ℓ.
It remains to show that the rows of HE are in the right
kernel of E. The rows of Bker fulfill this because E = AB
and Bker is a basis of the right kernel of B. For the first
tpub − ℓ rows of HE, we check:
E(A⊥Binv)
⊤ = ABB⊤inv(A
⊥)⊤ = 0 ,
which is true since A⊥B⊤invB
⊤ is a parity-check matrix with
respect to A.
Remark 10. Note that A⊥ as in Lemma 9 is a generator
matrix of a [tpub, tpub − ℓ] Gabidulin code since A
⊥B⊤invB
⊤
is one (the dual code of a [tpub, ℓ] Gabidulin code is a
[tpub, tpub − ℓ] Gabidulin code, cf. [23]) and B
⊤
invB
⊤ is an
invertible matrix over Fq (which means that we just need to
use different evaluation points in the Gabidulin code).
Lemma 11. Let E be defined as in Theorem 2, then
dimΛi
(
R
(
HE
) )
≤ min{n− ℓ+ i, n}.
Proof: We use Lemma 9. Since Binv and Bker are over
Fq , B
q
inv = Binv and B
q
ker = Bker. Further, dimΛi(A
⊥) =
min{tpub−ℓ+i, tpub}, cf. [40], sinceA
⊥ is a generator matrix
of a [tpub, tpub−ℓ] Gabidulin code. Thus, dimΛi
(
R
(
HE
) )
≤
min{n− ℓ+ i, n}.
Lemma 12. Let Hpub be a parity-check matrix of an
[n, k] code generated by Gpub. Then, dimΛi
(
R
(
Hpub
) )
=
min{(i+ 1)(n− k), n}, with high probability.
Lemma 13. Let C⊥aug = R
(
Hpub
)
∩R
(
HE
)
. Then,
C⊥aug + . . .+
(
C⊥aug
)[i]
⊆ R




Hpub
...
H
[i]
pub



 ∩R




HE
...
H
[i]
E



 .
Proof: We have C⊥aug ⊆ R
(
Hpub
)
, thus C⊥aug + . . . +(
C⊥aug
)[i]
⊆ R
(
[H⊤pub,H
[1]
pub
⊤
, . . . ,H
[i]
E
⊤
]⊤
)
. The same
holds for R
(
HE
)
, which proves the claim.
Theorem 14. Let C⊥aug = R
([
G⊤pubY
⊤
]⊤)⊥
. Then,
dim(Λi(C
⊥
aug)) ≤ min{n− l + i, (i+ 1)(n− k), n}.
Proof: The proof follows directly by Lemmas 11, 12 and
13.
In summary, by choosing A to be a generator matrix of
a Gabidulin code, the error code E can be distinguished
from an error matrix with random A. This does not imply
an explicit attack on the system, but indicates that there
might be a weakness in this case. The distinguisher must also
be considered when constructing codes from Open Research
Problem 1.
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